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Flighty Subjects: Sovereignty, Shifting Cultivators, and
the State in Darjeeling, 1830–1856

Catherine Warner

This paper focuses on the historical experiences
of shifting cultivators who lived in the eastern
Himalaya in the areas around Darjeeling, Eastern
Nepal, and Southern Sikkim in the early 19th
century. These groups played an important role
in state-formation in the precolonial period, as
regionally expansive states relied upon them
for labor, military levies, and revenue. Shifting
cultivators were organized under headmen
who dispensed justice, collected taxes, and
negotiated with the state on behalf of their
clients. The author argues that such groups
formed the basis of sovereignty on the frontier,
where control over subjects was more significant
than control over clearly demarcated territory.
Patrons of labor were well-versed in political
negotiations and dexterously managed the shift
to East India Company rule in Darjeeling in 1835;
however, the Company administrators changed
the terms of governance, even as they drew upon
the headmen’s services in accessing laborers.
By positing the labor market as the appropriate

means of securing labor, the Company officials
denied the role of the state in accumulating
labor power. In addition, colonial discourse fixed
shifting cultivators as backwards and in need
of protection, undermining their important
contributions to state formation under the
previous dispensation. By distancing itself from
patron-client relationships as vital to state
formation and discrediting these networks
of labor organization in favor of market logic,
the Company in theory moved the terms of
sovereignty towards territory rather than
people.
Keywords: Darjeeling, borderlands, colonialism, history,
shifting cultivation.
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Introduction
In April of 1925, a Lepcha in Dikchu, Sikkim, told an
anthropologist a story about the bat who evaded paying
taxes. According to the storyteller, Chyope, in the past
the birds had demanded revenue from a bat.1 “When
Nun-bong-pono-ong-fo (the king of birds) demanded his
tax, he [the bat] showed his teeth, and snarled, saying he
was not a bird, but that he belonged to the family of rats
(ka-lok) and would not pay any tax [to which birds were
subject].” The rat king, hearing this, came to collect his
due, but the bat flourished his wings and insisted that, as a
bird, he was exempt from paying any tax on rats. The two
kings held a council and decided to kill the bat for refusing to pay any taxes. The next day, the bat casually hung
from the eaves of a thatched roof and loudly proclaimed
that although soon he would be killed, he had many bat
relations working in the service of their own king who
would seek revenge. Overhearing this and fearing the bat’s
many supporters, the two kings fled. Chyope explained in
conclusion: “So that is why the bat is free from all taxation.
Everybody in the world pays some sort of revenue, even
we human beings, but the bat is free and doesn’t. That is
why he always hides in the day time, and flies at night”
(Stocks 1975: 47-48).
Although the anthropologist, De Beauvoir-Stocks, recorded this story some decades after the events of the period
I shall address—the East India Company’s annexation of
Darjeeling from Sikkim in 1835 and the initial development
of the colonial hill station through the 1850s—it evokes
key historiographical questions regarding sovereignty and
identity in the borderland. In the story, the kings, who
collect taxes on the basis of shared identity, collaborate
with one another to support their own authority vis-à-vis
their respective subjects. Sovereignty, then, is depicted
as exclusive and vested in the relationship between ruler
and subject, one based on shared qualities—one is either
a subject of bats or rats or birds. This view of kingship,
interestingly, does not match the multi-ethnic model of
the Namgyal rulers of Sikkim with which the Lepcha storyteller would have been most closely acquainted; rather,
the story suggests that state authority (as encompassed in
the right to collect taxes) rests with the heads of clans or
ethnic groups. For the subjects, belonging to such a group
meant protection from multiple, competing authorities,
all of whom might claim taxes or forced labor, in return
for subordination to a single ruler. Such patron-client
relationships were crucial foundations for building state
sovereignty in the pre-colonial dispensation and became
key sites for colonial intervention in the initial period of
Darjeeling’s development as a hill station.2
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Following the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-1816, the East India
Company assumed the right to adjudicate the border between Sikkim and Nepal, signaling its territorial ambitions
in the eastern Himalaya (Aitchison 1862). In practice, the
Company’s assumption of the right to arbitrate a spatially
defined, exclusive border between the two states produced
little change until disputes within Sikkim spilled over the
border into Nepal in the 1820s. The Company’s attempts
to insert boundaries between Sikkim, Nepal, and its own
territory after Darjeeling’s annexation in 1835, depended
upon its ability to understand—in order to shape—local
hierarchies, systems encompassing not only patron-client
relationships but also their attendant social and economic obligations. In this light, territorial disputes proved
inseparable from disputes about sovereignty over people.
As a colonial power, the East India Company was unable to
create strong linkages with Indian society or create hegemonic influence at the grassroots level (Yang 1989; Guha
1997). Thus, even as the Company engaged patron-client
networks to procure laborers for building the hill station,
these unequal relationships could no longer be considered
the basis for legitimate rule. The notion that sovereignty
adhered to territory rather than to people became an essential fiction for early 19th century colonial governance.
My argument builds upon the work of scholars who have
noted the colonial state’s territorialization of governance
and move towards unitary, non-overlapping forms of
sovereignty in contrast to the “divisible and negotiable” forms of a pre-colonial dispensation (Jalal 1995: 14).
Many scholars have also offered insights into the ways in
which colonial rule was territorialized by creating geographical inequalities and then employing discourses that
naturalized these inequalities. Such trends often meant
that forested and mountainous spaces demarcated as
‘indigenous’ became ruled as exceptional spaces in need
of authoritarian forms of control, as colonial discourses
defined indigenous people as less capable of participating
in the new colonial dispensation than other colonized
South Asians (Sivaramakrishnan 1999; Rai 2004; Shneiderman 2010; Sharma 2011; Ludden 2012). In accordance with
this changing notion of sovereignty, Company administrators described their efforts to attract and maintain manual
laborers for carrying provisions, clearing and preparing
building sites, and constructing roads, as the creation of a
labor market where none had existed. By positing the market as the ideal and just system for appropriating labor,
the EIC administrators discredited and contained existing
patron-client relationships even as they utilized them to
gain access to laborers. This move undermined the power
of labor patrons with whom pre-colonial states had formed
alliances to achieve a territorial presence in the frontier.

The colonial state would become the arbiter of territory
and leave the control of labor to the ‘market,’ effectively
reversing the terms, rather than practice, of sovereignty in
the borderland.3
Shifting Cultivation, Territory and State in the Eastern
Himalaya, c. 1650-1800
In the Eastern Himalaya and bordering tarai (plains) from
the 17th to the early 19th centuries, communities of shifting agriculturalists, including Lepcha, Limbu, and Mech
peoples, were important partners in state formation—a
dynamic often ignored in the standard colonial narrative
of gazetteers written after the mid-19th century (Hunter
1876: 18-19; O’Malley 1907: 19-25). Indeed, over the last
several decades, scholars have illuminated the integral
and enduring roles shifting cultivators played in regional
state formation and trade networks, even late into the
19th century, across the Indian subcontinent (Pouchepadas 1995; Sivaramakrishnan 1999; Pratap 2000). On the
basis of conversations with Lepcha elders in Sikkim in
the 1930s, ethnographer Geoffrey Gorer (1967) speculated
that Lepchas had largely abandoned fixed agriculture in
the 18th and 19th centuries and practiced more nomadic
lifestyles in an attempt to remain free of enslavement and
other abuses during frequent conflicts between regional,
expansive kingdoms. Therefore, shifting cultivation should
be understood as a historically specific strategy for maintaining distance from as well as negotiating with the state
rather than a relic from previous modes of production.
Regional states based on monarchies with non-local genealogies seem to have taken root in the eastern Himalaya
from the 17th century. Saul Mullard’s recent work on
Sikkimese state formation highlights the importance of the
‘Lho Mon Gtsong gsum agreement’ of 1663, which brought
into alliance the three major ethnic groups of Sikkim
(the Lho pa/ Tibeto-Sikkimese, the Mon/ Lepcha, and the
Gtsong/ Limbu). A number of chiefs or headmen of the
three ethnic groups provided their signatures, agreeing
to abolish “separate governments of Lho, Mon, or Gtsong.”
The agreement encapsulated the signers’ intent to form
a united government under the Namgyal lineage, and to
oppose outside influences that might intrude and disturb
the dharma (religious order) within the kingdom (Mullard
2011: 140-146). The Namgyal Rajas, also known as ‘Chogyal’
(dharma raja or upholder of the sacred order), employed
dharma and a unique legal code as a way to demarcate
sovereignty over ethnic communities who resided in Sikkim as well as several neighboring states. Other scholars
have noted that the extension of state space in the Eastern
Himalaya was closely bound up with the spread of ‘high

religion’ (namely Hinduism and Buddhism) and the re-definition of ethnic identities (English 1985; Ortner 1989). In
the case of the Lepchas, those who adopted the symbols
and rituals of Buddhism seem to have gained higher
status and greater claims to local resources vis-à-vis their
communities (Kilgour 1897). Similarly, the Hindupati Sen
Kingdom of present-day eastern Nepal, also established in
the mid-17th century, governed by emphasizing religious
patronage and extra-territorial connections as Hindu rulers over a primarily animistic population (Pradhan 1991;
Krauskopff 2000).4
While regional courtly lineages, such as the Namgyals and
Sens, built state power by defining the boundaries of group
identity among the subject population in the Eastern
Himalaya, resistance to such rule might idealize horizontal
bonds within ethnic groups to subvert the state. As James
Scott (2009) has argued in a different context, one can
interpret the defining and policing of communal identities
as a state strategy spread across colonial and non-colonial
states. Mullard, on the other hand, views ethnic groups as
partners in state formation in his emphasis on the agency
of Lepchas, Limbus, and Tibeto-Sikkimese in the Lho Mon
Gtsong gsum agreement establishing Sikkim. Espousing a
view closer to Scott’s, late 20th-century Lepcha activist A.
R. Foning argues that this was a case of divide and rule. In
his view, the Namgyal lineage authored the pact in order
to engineer a political break between Lepchas and Limbus,
who otherwise shared common origins and many cultural
practices. Foning argues that Lepcha society never took
on a hierarchical structure—only seniors were accorded
special rank—and only the import of Tibetan feudalism
created a distinction between elite and commoner Lepchas. The Lepchas had only consented to the installation
of the Namgyal dynasty in 1642, Foning contends, to honor
an older pact formed when a Lepcha senior “was coaxed
into ceremoniously swearing eternal friendship of brotherhood with the Tibetans who were gradually infiltrating
into [their] land” (1987: 8). Taken together, Mullard’s and
Foning’s historical arguments about identity formation
suggest that both the community and the state negotiated,
and at times contested, the terms of belonging and identity
as part of a dynamic social and political dispensation in the
pre-colonial Himalaya.
The kingdom of Gorkha expanded eastward in the late
18th century and, after it dismantled the intervening Sen
kingdoms, its frontier came to rest against that of the kingdom of Sikkim. For several decades, the frontier between
Gorkha and Sikkim remained contested, without much
apparent anxiety to either side. When Francis Buchanan
(later Hamilton), a physician and servant in the Bengal
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Medical Service, constructed a history of the Eastern Himalaya and border tarai in the early 19th century at the behest
of the Company, he expressed significant doubt about
who controlled which areas. Indeed, an open frontier may
have been desirable in a situation in which neither state
had sufficient military power to police the border. In some
places, Sikkim and Nepal seemed to have shared control
of territory—for example, of Nagri fort near a frontier
trade route (Hamilton (1819) 1971). Yet while two kingdoms might share territory, not so high-status subjects. In
the late 18th century, as Gorkha expanded into the Pallo
Kirat region of present-day eastern Nepal, a number of
important local people fled to Sikkim. Gorkha king Prithvi
Narayan Shah’s agents were deputed to offer Sikkim the
choice of turning out the refugees or facing battle. Sikkim
chose the former option (Vajracharya and Shrestha 1978).
Thus, both states vied for exclusive access to networks of
local patron-client networks, in the majority Limbu region,
as a way of asserting their local influence over trade routes
and hill products and resources.
Patron-Client Relationships among Shifting
Agriculturalists
The frontier areas of western and southern Sikkim and
eastern Nepal (an area encompassing present-day Darjeeling), in the early 19th century, were largely populated
by groups of shifting agriculturalists allied with regional states. These alliances, apparently reaching back to
the consolidation of regional states in the 17th century,
formed around powerful men who could mobilize labor
and impose a tax on agrarian surplus. An agreement
between the Sen kings (the regional rulers preceding
Gorkha expansion) and the Kirats (of present-day eastern
Nepal) stipulated that the Kirat headmen must keep lists of
tax-payers, and maintain watch over who entered and left
their areas of jurisdiction. Headmen were also responsible
for producing stipulated numbers of trained warriors on
demand (Naraharinath 1966: 92-95). Mullard’s work supports the notion that regional states were keeping written
records of tax obligations to some degree in the 17th century; Mullard has translated a fragment listing Sikkimese
subjects of various ethnicities (primarily Lepcha and Limbu) contained in a Tibetan manuscript compiled from 1645
to 1676, or a few decades after the Namgyal establishment.
Later documents resembling this list found in the Sikkim
archive are explicitly labeled tax lists (Mullard 2011). That
censuses were taken by the regional states for the purposes of taxation also seems to be borne out by the experience
of the colonial census takers in Darjeeling District in 1871:
a number of locals fled across the border into Nepal to
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avoid being counted because they feared enumeration and
taxation went hand-in-hand (Baines 1892).
Given the scarcity of labor, local social norms were necessarily incorporative. Limbu activist and scholar Iman Singh
Chemjong’s translation of codes pertaining to community adoptions suggests that incorporating new members
into the group was significant for defining Limbu cultural
practice. Adoptions would take place during an assembly
of representatives of the ten chiefs of the districts, a ceremony that included the adopter and adoptee. According to
his translation, the priest would remind the assembly that
this was an old tradition sanctioned by the wisdom of their
forefathers who had promoted population growth as a collective good. He would also remind them of the words of
the forefathers: “If any member of any other nationality or
race or tribe or family or cast or creed desires to join your
family, let him be accepted among your children as members of the same fold.” The ceremony ended by declaring
that the adoptee “no longer belong[ed] to [his] old caste or
race or tribe.” The assembly would record the decision in
a written agreement with all present signing as witnesses,
subject to a set fine if any among them should go on to
speak badly of the adopted person (Chemjong 2003: 60-62).
Thus, group sanction ensured acceptance of new members.
More details about the organization of shifting cultivators
emerge from colonial administrators’ observations about
Mech and Dhimal groups located in the low foothills to the
southwest of Darjeeling and Lepchas in the hills around the
new station from the late 1830s. These groups paid revenue and provided free labor to Sikkim, which claimed them
as its subjects. Rather than living in condensed villages,
families were spread out across a loosely defined jungle
area, partially clearing land for cultivation through cutting
and burning and moving on after three years. Sikkim’s
tax structure encouraged such movement with increased
rates imposed after the third year. Shifting cultivators
also gained leverage with the state authorities to whom
they paid taxes by holding out the threat of relocating to
a neighboring sovereign’s area. Each cultivator paid a tax
determined by his number of tools to a headman who was
acknowledged to have first found and settled the clients in
the area.5 As a Mandal heading a group of Mech and Dhimal
cultivators asserted in the mid-19th century, Mandals “get
followers and Ryots when ever [sic] they can, they bring
them from other countries to their own, and in whatever
part of the country between the Mechi and the Teesta
[Rivers] the person so brought may reside. The Meches
recognise no territorial division among the Chowdrys. It
is the Ryots [sic] that are divided…” The Mandals acted as
the headmen of a group of tax-paying shifting cultivators,

provided some judicial authority, and handed the taxes
over to a Chaudhari, or regional revenue official, who then
conveyed the payments to Sikkim.6
Lepchas were also organized under headmen, but in contrast with the Mech of the lower hills, were more closely
integrated into Sikkim’s military service structure. Many
Lepcha headmen owed armed service to Sikkim while
others owed service and tax to Buddhist Lamas. Anthropologist Lionel Caplan argued that the customary rights
of “first settlers” formed the basis of the kipat (communal
system of land tenure) in the Limbu region of eastern
Nepal (1970). The ways in which Mandals gathered and
settled raiyats (subjects), possibly by force, in the region
suggest that the rights of first settlement were in part
established by the regulation of shifting cultivation and
allowed the Mandals stronger claims to land than their
clients. In the hills, the Lepchas grew dry rice and maize
without use of the plough. Mech agriculture followed the
same pattern but also included cotton, which cultivators
marketed in local bazaars. Like the Kirats in the late 18th
century, as discussed above, group membership depended
on patronage, organization of shifting agriculture as producing an (at least marginal) economic surplus, and a loose
relationship with geography, rather than strictly defined
ethnic or territorial sovereignty (The Dorjeeling Guide 1845;
Hooker 1854; Gorer 1967; Pinn 1986).7
Patterns of shifting cultivation were structured by obligations of forced labor, including personally attending or
guarding a person of rank, carrying supplies, and domestic
or agricultural labor owed to headmen and the Sikkim
Raja. As the East India Company annexed Darjeeling in
1835 and moved into the region, the balance of authority
seems to have tilted towards the Chaudharis. For example,
the Mech Chaudharis in the foothills continued to collect
unlimited begar (forced labor), even as they helped their
clients to negotiate an increased revenue payment in return for excused labor obligations to Sikkim. Substituting
cash payments for forced labor indicates a move towards
equating labor with a particular and definable value. The
Mech people were accustomed to trading their agricultural and forest products, especially cotton, in the markets located in their own forests as well as in Darjeeling.8
Increased market linkages helped the shifting agriculturalists to negotiate their relationship with the regional state
(especially the labor obligation) through access to cash.
Indeed, cash commutation for labor taxes was not limited
to Sikkim; in the late 18th century the Gorkhas introduced
a new set fee in eastern Nepal for Limbus to pay in

substitution of forced labor. The practice of optional cash
commutation spread to the rest of Nepal by the early 19th
century (Sagant 2003).
Shifting Cultivators and Clients Talk to the Company
During the Anglo-Nepal War between the East India
Company and the Gorkha state (1814-1816), the Company
wanted to curtail Gorkha expansion to the east but lacked
the military manpower to do so. Instead, Captain Latter
(stationed with troops in Purnia) provided Sikkim with
limited weapons and the assurance that if their armed
forces could overthrow the Gorkhas in their territory,
the Company would support them after the war (Papers
Respecting the Nepaul War 1822). Lepcha and Limbu officers
and soldiers revolted against the Gorkha outposts, and the
Company penned a treaty fixing the territorial gains. The
Company then effected a separate non-treaty agreement
with Sikkim transferring the tarai region to the royal lineage and heirs “in consideration of the services performed
by the Hill tribes under the control of the Raja of Sikkim”
(Aitchison 1862: 143). Thus, while the crucial role of the
“Hill tribes” in effecting the military victory is acknowledged, the spoils went to the monarchy. This treaty can be
read as a first step in the Company’s efforts to reduce the
influence of groups of shifting cultivators in the region, in
favor of engaging unilaterally with Sikkim’s monarchy.
The East India Company justified its claim to the Darjeeling
area by factitiously arguing that only under its influence
could the local population co-exist peacefully and then
seized upon the occasion of a border dispute to expand
into the region. In 1826, the Lepcha Prime Minister, Chagzot Bolot (also known as Buljeet) was murdered by a court
faction as Tshudpud Namgyal (r. 1793-1863) attempted to
reassert his lineage’s authority and overturn the puppet
status to which the Lepcha ‘Bar phung clan had subjugated
him. The Prime Minister had supposedly taken the king’s
red seal and misappropriated the revenue, both understood as treasonous acts. This was not a simple Lepcha versus Tibeto-Sikkimese power struggle, as by this time the
royal and ministerial families had become linked through
marriage—Bolot was the uncle through his wife to Chogyal
Tshudpud Namgyal. Bolot’s nephews fled to Ilam (Nepal),
part of their patrimonial estate, taking about 800 Lepcha
households from Chidan and Namthang (Sprigg 1995; Mullard 2010). Apparently, Colonel Lloyd, the Company’s intermediary with Sikkim, had encouraged the Lepcha faction
to leave Sikkim, as he thought it would simplify political
affairs in the country. The Lepcha refugees, protected by
Nepal, were based near Ilam on a hill called Onto situated
between the headwaters of the Mechi river, but Jerung
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Kazi requested the Agent for the North-Eastern Frontier
Colonel Lloyd’s permission to return to his patrimonial
estate around Darjeeling (O’Malley 1907). Moreover, the
refugee Kazis claimed that Lloyd had encouraged their
exodus from Sikkim and as such he owed them some land
in compensation. Sikkim and Nepal’s dispute over possession of Onto, then, was as much about jurisdiction over
people as territory, yet nevertheless fell within the treaty’s
stipulations of Company arbitration. Archibald Campbell
of the Nepal Residency, Colonel Lloyd, and the Commercial
Agent from Malda, G.W. Grant, mediated the initial border
mission. Grant and Lloyd noticed Darjeeling’s favorable
landscape and exhorted the Governor-General to negotiate
with Sikkim for the territory whenever possible in order to
create a sanitarium in the eastern Himalaya accessible to
the Bengal Presidency. In the winter of 1834-1835, Sikkim
accused the Lepcha refugees in Nepal of intruding into the
Sikkim Morang, leading to fresh border disputes. Colonel
Lloyd returned to the region and used this opportunity to
secure the succession of Darjeeling in return for repulsing
the refugees.9
At this time, the border dispute was still unsettled, as the
Mechi River had been designated the accepted border
between Nepal and Sikkim in the treaty of 1817 without,
however, designating exactly where this river originated.
The Company deposed deputies for Sikkim and Nepal to
settle the border for the last time in 1838 (several years
after the annexation of Darjeeling) from which a number
of transcripts survive.10 From this series of depositions and
commentary, we gain a sense of the way territorial control
was structured around patron-client relationships as well
as a hint of the perspective of the clients (the ‘bats’ in the
Lepcha folktale). The Lepchas controlled the area on the
ground, but many of the men interviewed had worked in
various capacities as local functionaries (even as shikhari,
or huntsman) for Nepal, Sikkim, and Lepcha Kazis, who
were semi-independent of Sikkim at different times. Limbus, Lepchas, and some migrants from the mid-western
Nepal hills had previously cultivated the area, and it had
recently been connected by road (constructed through the
use of local forced labor) from Ilam to Nagri and towards
the Mechi River but not yet up to the Company frontier. It
seems that following the war, Sikkim had captured and relocated Onto’s shifting cultivators within its own territory.
Later, a number of them had returned to Nepal.
In the depositions from the border settlement of 1838,
when questioned about the impetus behind their patterns
of movement between Sikkim and Nepal, the clients provided conflicting testimony. Ajuk (known to other Lepchas
as ‘Adhikari’ or ‘Secretary’), formerly acted as an orderly
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for Chatrajit, also known as Chutup, Lepcha leader of the
Sikkimese forces.11 Ajuk claimed that he was taken by force
from his home near Ilam by Sikkim troops and relocated to Chongtong in Sikkim after the Anglo-Nepal war of
1814-1816.12 When asked by the Company translator if he
was “taken by force or with his [own] consent,” he replied
that he was taken “by force.” However, when questioned
how long he remained in Sikkim and whether he had been
free to leave, he replied that he remained for “six or seven
years…of [his] own freewill.”
Humsbarra, a 47-year-old Limbu, responded to the boundary agents’ questions by explaining in greater detail the
capture of local people by armed Lepchas from Sikkim
after Jaintia Khatri, the Gorkha Subah (commander) posted
at Nagri, had been forced to retreat to Nepal following the
war. Humsbarra said that the “Sikkim people” came and
“carried away Elam Sing and Eknaggree and many Lepchas
and Limboos.” Upon further questioning, he stated: “They
took all the Lepchas. The Limboos fled to Phakphoi westward.” When asked for names, Humsbarra mentioned “Aka
Limboo. Eknaggree and gooling Soobeeas. Debria Jimpan.
Lupchas [sic]. And others.” The examiner asked Humsbarra
to verify Ajuk’s story (noted above) that he was captured
and taken by the Sikkimese party. Humsbarra clarified:
“They carried away his Chief, he [Ajuk] hid himself at the
time and followed them afterwards.” Clearly, there was a
different understanding of ethnic or corporate identity in
which Lepcha and Limbu identities overlap, even if some
distinction was understood by local people.13
Testimonies contained in the report of 1838 also indicate
that revenue obligations could cross state boundaries.
Kookah, a 75-year-old Lepcha, reiterated that after the
war “[s]ome soldiers from Sikim [sic] came and took away
the [military/civil officers] and carried them across the
Rumbong river to Nagree.” He said that he too was taken,
as well as his Chief. Kookah remained in the area across
the Rumbong River in Sikkim and cultivated for one year,
after which he returned to his place of origin, Siddileang
[Nepal]. His Chief, Gooling Jumpun [Dzongpon?], settled at
Chongtong in Sikkim. After returning to Siddileang, Kookah continued to pay revenue intermittently to his chief
at Chongtong (although they were technically under two
different states). He stated that he used to go to Chongtong
and take the chief things, “[s]ome as Nuzzur some as revenue.” This statement suggests that a degree of voluntary
action and reciprocity existed in this relationship, as nazar
would have been a gift, perhaps for protection, which Kookah made according to his own means and needs, whereas
revenue would have indicated a more bureaucratic and
fixed demand. Kookah further stated that in this manner,

he paid revenue for two years to Gooling Jumpun and then
he did not pay anyone for two years—a statement which
further underscores Kookah’s relative autonomy vis-à-vis
his chief.
These testimonies taken from the boundary commission
reveal that Nepal was still working to insert itself into
the local political economy around Ilam (formerly subject
to the defunct Sen kingdom) in the early 19th century.
Further, the eastern boundaries of Nepal and Sikkim
overlapped, with each state having promoted the settlement of subjects within the same territory. At the same
time, Lepchas clearly held the balance of power in the
area, as the Nepali subjects had to leave when the Lepchas
‘revolt[ed]’ during the war of 1814-1816 (Aitchison 1862:
149-152; The Dorjeeling Guide 1845: 66). Sri Kishan Gharti
Havildar, of Ilam gadhi (fort) in Nepal, stated that his older
brother had been deputed by Nepal to settle people in
the Khoegurry ridge at the time when Jaintia Khatri was
Subah. The settlers would not pay revenue for five years,
after which time they were to pay their revenues to the
Gorkha company stationed at Nagri. The brother of the
havildar (low-ranking officer) brought raiyats, including 20
families of his caste, as well as his own family from Majh
Kirat. They had to depart the area after one year, however, because the war broke out, followed by ‘the revolt of
the Lepchas.’ When Nepal allowed the settlement of the
Lepcha refugees near Ilam some 20 years later, they too
were to pay their revenues to the military outpost, and the
appointed jagirdar (land grantee) was exhorted to settle
more raiyats from ‘Bhot’ and ‘Muglan’ in the area (Vajracharya and Shrestha 1978).
These examples reveal an intricate sense of service and patronage encompassing both free and unfree forms of labor,
and spanning state boundaries. Moreover, these testimonies indicate that the ability of actors within patron-client relationships to constitute and effectively negotiate
extra-territorial networks underscored their shifting and
relative power vis-à-vis one another. The hegemony of
the intermediaries locally is highlighted by the tendency
in the depositions for calendric time to be reckoned by
the tenure of such intermediaries rather than the reign
of regional monarchs. For example, many deponents
refer to ‘the time of Jaintia Khatri’ (the Gorkha Subbah or
commander) or ‘the time of Yukunda Kazi’ (a Lepcha chief
who paid revenue to Jaintia Khatri) to situate past events.
State extension was made possible through personal ties
of patronage in which intermediaries accepted allegiance
to one of the states, but the majority of shifting cultivators
maintained no direct ties with the regional state, so their
status as state subjects remained ambiguous. For example,

while Ajuk initially hid from the Sikkimese soldiers, he
later felt compelled to follow his patron. Perhaps because
the Sikkimese understood this degree of obligation in the
relationship, they only took the more important men, the
military officers. While the relationship between subject
and chief seems in some ways as one of total dependency,
which Chatterjee and Eaton (2006) have defined as slavery
in the South Asian context, there was also an apparent degree of latitude. Kookah only intermittently offered presents to his chief and after two years seems to have stopped
altogether, despite the relationship of dependency remaining socially acknowledged. The folktale about the bat
and the rat and bird kings cited above offers some sense
of the calculations upon which clients may have relied to
gauge their current or former patron’s political standing
and thus his ability to enforce payments or, alternately,
positively intervene on behalf of the clients within larger
networks. Indeed, Superintendent of Darjeeling Campbell
explained the frequent visits of the Kazi’s representatives
from Ilam (in eastern Nepal) in the late 1830s and early
1840s as important for the Kazis, not only in negotiating
their relationship with the governors of the new hill station but also, and equally so, in convincing their clients of
their enduring political influence, despite recent changes.14
The fluidity and reshaping of such networks is captured
well by a group of Lepcha shifting cultivators near Darjeeling who claimed that they paid revenue ‘to anyone’
when questioned by the new colonial authorities in 1839.
Patron-client networks remained essential for the shifting
cultivators of the eastern Himalaya as they faced political
changes concomitant with the colonial encroachment.
Colonial Intervention: Separating Shifting Cultivators
from the State
Company officials also took advantage of networks of patronage to build infrastructure and provide services in the
new hill station. In 1838, shortly after annexation, Colonel
Lloyd counted 21 Lepcha ‘families’ settled close by the
hill station, totaling 51 males and 37 females. About half
of them paid revenue to the Sikkim Raja, the other half to
an unnamed ‘head Lama.’15 Until the plantation economy
reconfigured the landscape in the 1860s, land revenue was
collected on an ad hoc basis, which the first official settlement of 1850 simply maintained. Collections were funneled
through the old patron-client system and resembled more
closely “the superintendence of a private estate than
the collection of Government revenue” (Jackson 1854:
11). Darjeeling’s first official Superintendent, Campbell,
attempted to gain the favor of various Lepcha Kazis, Mech
Chaudharis, and other labor patrons, drawing in part
upon his initial encounter with local notables near Onto
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in 1838 (Campbell 1869). For example, Campbell sent gifts
to the Tibeto-Sikkimese Kazi of Bhadaong, who controlled
a tract straddling the Tista River; in return, the Kazi sent
craftsmen to Darjeeling. For this favor, Campbell spent
about Rs.42 to buy presents as well as a gun, as requested.
In this case as in others, initially the supply of workmen
seems to have benefitted the patron rather than the workers.16 Campbell openly admitted that he drew upon such
cross-border ties to attract almost 2,000 laborers to Darjeeling in the initial years after annexation. He explained
to his superiors:
Formerly, the resort of Nipalese [sic] to Darjeeling
for service or trade was discountenanced, if not
altogether prohibited, by the authorities at Ilam.
Now…the people are encouraged to resort hither
for the purposes of trade and servitude and the same
is pointed to by their rulers as an honorable and easy
method of obtaining money for the payment of their rents
a mode preferred at Ilam to the usage of doing so
in grain, cattle or labor as they were wont from impossibility of concerting the produce of their labor,
or their labor itself into Cash.17
In other words, Campbell drew upon the needs of patrons,
especially their desire for cash, rather than the interests of
their subjects in order to obtain manual laborers.
While Campbell insisted in his correspondence with the
Government of Bengal that he was creating a local labor
market to supply the station’s needs, the political nature of
the networks was all too obvious to his Company superiors. Government expressed appreciation that Campbell
had settled the Lepcha refugees from Nepal in Darjeeling,
as well as some Mech shifting cultivators formerly subject to Sikkim, but cautioned Campbell against inviting
groups from neighboring countries because it might lead
to political conflict.18 On the one hand, Sikkim repeatedly
called for its subjects who had settled in Company-controlled Darjeeling to be returned. On the other hand, a
number of local intermediaries realized the potential for
vastly expanding their own influence if they could corner a
monopoly on settling people around Darjeeling.19 Thus, for
example, Jerung Kazi petitioned Colonel Lloyd in 1839 to
allow him to bring his dependents from Ilam and to “be restored to the situation of collecting the revenues, managing the country in the hills and Morung, and exercising the
office of the Dewan as held by [his] uncle Buljeet” (quoted
in Pinn 1986: 171). Jerung Kazi apparently viewed the
exchange of the labor power of his dependents as meriting
an official position.20
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Campbell built the hill station through developing longterm relationships with intermediaries who controlled
dependents, rather than developing a labor market as he
claimed; yet, he refused to accord bureaucratic position
to the intermediaries who supplied him with labor. Chebu
Lama became one of Campbell’s closest Lepcha associates,
one who mediated Company-Sikkim diplomacy initially as
vakil (diplomatic agent) for the latter and later in a more
private capacity for the former. In return for his loyalty,
Campbell granted him a tract near Darjeeling in 1850.21
Nevertheless, the Superintendent patronizingly regarded
Chebu Lama as a sort of pet informant who, he asserted,
displayed the extent of “mental and moral development
attainable by a Lepcha—namely, through European influence and guidance” (Campbell 1869: 153). While Chebu
Lama filled the role of a Lepcha native informant, his
mother was a Lepcha and his father a ‘Bhotia’ (Tibeto-Sikkimese), as Campbell acknowledges (Campbell 1869). Since
descent was often determined by the father’s side of the
family (thus the Namgyals could marry Limbu and Lepcha
wives, for example, without producing Limbu or Lepcha
children), and Chebu Lama’s father was not, as mentioned,
a Lepcha, he probably retained the option of identifying
with Tibeto-Sikkimese circles (Hooker 1854; Risley 1894).
In fact, this pedigree may have helped Chebu Lama remain
influential in a court setting in which Lepcha factions
had so recently been expelled from favor. Whereas Chebu
Lama had worked as vakil to Sikkim, he had to negotiate
with the Company on the basis of his indigenous status. As
indicated by the language of the treaty between the East
India Company and Sikkim which set the state for Company influence, ‘Hill tribes’ would no longer be accorded
political status in subsequent negotiations. Thus, Chebu
Lama gained land and wealth, but undermined his own
claims to state authority in the new colonial dispensation
by emphasizing his Lepcha rather than Tibeto-Sikkimese
background (Hooker 1854; Aitchison 1862).
That local patrons of labor came to understand the terms
upon which they were to engage the Company—as indigenous representatives rather than state officials—is further
highlighted in a petition from a group of Mech shifting
cultivators conveyed by Superintendent Campbell to the
Government of Bengal in 1850. At the time, a Company military contingent had occupied the Sikkim Morang (plains)
following a dispute with Sikkim enflamed by Campbell’s
unexpected arrest and detention while visiting Sikkim in
the fall of 1849.22 The disagreement between the two states
largely arose because Sikkim claimed that the Company’s
administration in Darjeeling was taking its subjects and
obstructing its trade, thus eating into its revenue base. In
response, Campbell declared Sikkim’s subjects to be slaves

who preferred the so-called free market in Darjeeling.
Campbell’s labor market clearly resembled the pre-existing
patron-client relationships far more than he admitted: as
he tried to find manual laborers for porterage and jungle
clearing for his military campaign, he called on local “ethnic” leaders, to whom he had given the right to settle shifting cultivators in the new territory, to provide conscripts.
His claim to forced labor in return for his recognition of
the headmen’s position directly paralleled the previous
dispensation he claimed to have overturned.23
In the petition, penned while his home territory (the
Sikkim Morang) was under military occupation, Bir Singh
Chaudhari leaves out the immediate political context, as
well as his own negotiations with Company representatives stretching over several decades from the time of the
original border surveys. Indeed, the first acting supervisor
of the station, Lloyd, had appointed Bir Singh in 1838 to
collect taxes from the Mech and Dhimals in the Company’s
new territory and to collect a transit duty on merchandise entering and leaving the station, even before the
Government had approved such a measure. Moreover, his
residence near the road built from Titalya (now in Bangladesh) to Darjeeling in the early 1840s ensured contact with
European travelers who expected him to provide laborers
for carrying baggage. Yet, the area of the Morang in which
he, as well as the cultivators, resided, was contested by
Nepal, Sikkim, and increasingly the Company (as its only
approach to the hill station from Bengal was via Sikkim’s
plains). Perhaps to escape such conflicting demands, he
somewhat successfully petitioned the Company in the
1830s to allow him to become its subject rather than that
of Sikkim, although the latter did not recognize this distinction.24
Bir Singh’s first petition, co-authored with twenty Mandals (headmen) who apparently worked under him, is
couched in oddly ethnographic rather than political terms.
The petition begins with the line: “The following are our
customs and habits” and goes on to argue that the Mech
homeland is different because of the organization of shifting cultivators there. This formulation likely comes from
his close association with Campbell, who admitted to his
superiors that “the petition [was] in some degree personal
to [himself].”25 Further, Campbell had previously collected
ethnographic data from Bir Singh’s clients to study and
write about the Mech people. The petition suggests that
Bir Singh understood Campbell’s ethnographic interest
as integral to the latter’s official duties (rather than as a
hobby as Campbell likely regarded it). Bir Singh argued
that his people could not be attached to Purnia because
they could not adapt to traveling outside of the jungle to

attend court and engage with the government there. The
distinction between living in Purnia, a district of Bengal,
and Darjeeling, a non-regulation district in which Bengal’s
legal system was mediated by the paternalistic authority of
the Superintendent, was not lost on Bir Singh. The Chaudhari clearly would benefit from joining Darjeeling, where
his status as patron to about 200 Mech cultivators would
be recognized and rewarded, yet he framed his petition by
arguing that as an indigenous group, they needed protection. Moreover, Bir Singh seems to have been engaged in
a long-standing dispute with neighbors in Purnia, who he
feared would involve him in court cases there. He concludes his second petition by once again downplaying
political considerations:
If we are made over to the Purneah authorities we
shall have no one to understand our affairs, and
cases, as our languages are quite unknown there,
and we know not the languages used there. We
are poor people, and are not in any way rebellious.
Purneah and Darjeeling are both in the British
dominions, but we hope that we may be placed
under Darjeeling, so that our lands and homes may
remain to us under your protecting Rule.26
Thus he claims the need for protection because he and his
people were “ignorant of the manner in which the business
of the Courts is transacted in the Company’s territories,”
whereas he seems actually quite aware of the implications
of attachment to Purnia.27 Like Chebu Lama and various
Lepcha Kazis, Bir Singh found it expedient to negotiate
with the Company as an indigenous representative who
could mediate on behalf of a supposedly backwards group,
because he realized this was an effective language to employ with the Company representatives.
Bir Singh’s Victory and a Conclusion
Bir Singh Chaudhari’s calculations may seem shortsighted, as the indigenous people around Darjeeling would be
steamrolled by the spread of tea plantations from 1856.
Yet, if we set aside our present-day knowledge of dispossession and marginalization by the colonial plantation
economy in Darjeeing in the latter half of the 19th century,
we might better appreciate Bir Singh’s efforts as he, in
fact, got his way. As of February 1850, the Company had
decided to annex the entire Sikkim Morang to Purnia, in
accordance with the idea that hills and plains should be
administered separately. A month later, after a number of
shifting cultivators had fled to Nepal, the Government of
Bengal reversed the decision—the lower foothills around
Pankhabari in which the Mech resided would be annexed
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to Darjeeling instead of Purnia. The Secretary to the Board
of Revenue even warned local authorities that Purnia’s establishment should have little contact with the Mech since
they would be attached to Darjeeling, but that “whenever occasion for communication may arise, the Purneah
Authorities should be as considerate and conciliating as
possible in their dealings with them, for the accounts show
that they are such a timid and ignorant people, a trifling
misunderstanding might cause them to abscond into Nipal
or Bootan.” Threats of desertion worked, yet the terms
upon which Bir Singh Chaudhari and the Mech Mandals
achieved temporary victory (as a “timid and ignorant
people” when this was far from the case), would aid the
Company in undermining the rights of shifting cultivators
in the new dispensation ushered in with the spread of tea
plantations just a half dozen years later.28
In conclusion, let us revisit the folktale about the renegade
bat. In the story, it is the bat who wields power over the
rather ridiculous and vulnerable figures of the rat king
and the bird king. They are quick to threaten violence,
but end up running away when the bat outwits them by
playing with the boundaries of identity. By the 1850s, this
strategy was waning in effectiveness. With the extension
of colonial rule, there were few such figures left who could
operate outside state control by negotiating the fuzzy
areas between corporate identities and mobilizing personal relationships for support. While shifting cultivation
may have represented a strategy for maintaining distance
from competing regional states in the 18th and early 19th
centuries, it offered limited scope for doing so over time as
the East India Company came to define the terms of sovereignty in the borderland as territorial rather than based
on control over subjects. In this way, negotiation with the
state based on defining and/or subverting group identities,
as the bat had demonstrated, became a losing proposition.
By delimiting group identities as fixed and immutable, and
redefining sovereignty as territorial, the colonial state ensured that bats would always remain bats, but that kings,
be they of birds or of rats, would get their due.
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Endnotes
1. ‘Lepcha’ is the Nepali term for the supposedly indigenous
people of the Darjeeling area; as colonial administrators
and missionaries observed, ‘Rong-pa’ or ‘people of the
ravine’ was their own label. For example, see Kilgour
(1897).
2. See Kennedy (1996) for a nuanced discussion of the
initial growth of hill stations as sanitaria in the hill areas
of the three Presidencies in the early 19th century. The
trend represented a response to concern for the excessive
mortality especially of lower-level European civil and
military personnel; this was an era when climatic rather
than a germ-theory of disease directed public health
efforts. Europeans in the Presidency towns who wanted
to escape the plains and reproduce British social life away
from the supposedly corrupting influences of Indian life
eagerly supported the development of hill stations.
3. Following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire,
the language of the free market became a way for British
administrators to claim that colonized people were able
to enter contracts to exchange their labor of their own
volition. This discourse was used to justify the massive
export of indentured labor to the West Indies as well as
legitimize other appropriations of labor, as for example,
in Darjeeling (Banerjee 2010). For a greater elaboration
of the role of colonial ethnography in defining indigenous
identities in the eastern Himalaya, see Chapter Two of
my dissertation (in progress), ‘States of Labor: Migrants,
Markets and Sovereignty in the India-Nepal Borderland,
1800-1930.’
4. The Sens of Vijaypur (present-day eastern Nepal) were
linked though kinship ties to the Palpa Sen rulers who had
consolidated rule over the Himalayan foothills and tarai
from Palpa (north of present-day Gorakhpur) in the 16th
century. The Sens were only able to expand into the eastern
Morang through the invitation of powerful Kirat chiefs who

32 | HIMALAYA Spring 2014

had been acting as king-makers for several generations and
wanted to overthrow their nominal rulers in the mid-17th
century (Pradhan 1991).
5. Some of the clients were likely to have been kidnapped.
See The Dorjeeling Guide (1845).
6. From A. Campbell to J. P. Grant, Darjeeling, 1 March
1850, No. 458, Foreign Department (Hereafter FD), 14 June
1850. National Archives of India (Hereafter NAI).
7. See also, No. 458, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
8. No. 458, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
9. Affairs of Nepaul, 74755, F/4/1813, 1839-1840, Boards
Collections (Hereafter BC), India Office Library (Hereafter
IOL).
10. The following depositions are all found in: Proceedings
held by Lt. Coll. Lloyd, and A. Campbell Esqr, 14 Oct 1838,
74755, F/4/1813, 1839-1840, BC, IOL.
11. For Chtrajit’s (Chutup’s) role, see Moktan (2004: 247).
12. That a number of people migrated from the Ilam region
to Sikkim after the war is also corroborated by Nepali
sources (Manandhar 1983).
13. Foning, writing in the late 20th century, claims that
the Limbus and Lepchas were once related tribes, the
Limbus having settled to the west (in present-day eastern
Nepal) and the Lepchas having settled towards the east
(in present-day Sikkim). The people in the middle region
around Ilam were mixed and could easily assimilate with
either Lepchas or Limbus. He explains that the Ilam people
used to be humorously labeled “Nembang-moo Rongs,
meaning two-and-a-half Lepchas” because they were
known as exceedingly “clever and quick-witted.” According
to Foning, many of the Ilam Lepchas settled in and around
Darjeeling and assisted the missionaries in their activities
from the mid-19th century (1987: 131-132).
14. Affairs of Sikkim & Darjeeling, 87212, F/4/1981, 184243, BC, IOL.
15. It is possible that this refers to Chebu Lama as he had
remained in Sikkim’s favor during the Dewan’s assassination
and subsequent Lepcha exodus, so he would have been
one of the few high-ranking Lepchas in a position to collect
revenue near Darjeeling prior to annexation. No. 72, FD, 10
July 1839, NAI.
16. Proceedings relating to Sikkim and Darjeeling, 83500,
F/4/1934, BC, IOL.
17. Emphasis added. Nepaul and Catmandoo Residency,
87211, F/4/1981, 1842-43, BC, IOL; Affairs of Nepaul,
74755, F/4/1813, 1839-1840, BC, IOL.

18. Proceedings relating to Sikkim and Darjeeling, 83500,
F/4/1934, BC, IOL.
19. Affairs of Sikkim & Darjeeling, 87212, F/4/1981, 184243, BC, IOL.
20. It is also interesting to note that the Jerung Kazi
regarded the office of ‘Dewan,’ held by his uncle who was
assassinated over 10 years before, as entirely divisible
from the Sikkim government. This suggests that the office
of Chief Revenue Minister or Diwan was fashioned to
incorporate alternative sources of power into monarchical
lineages, rather than created from within the lineage. See
for example, Hamilton (1819); Regmi (1975).
21. Chebu Lama seemed to maintain a firm grip over the
services of shifting agriculturalists who he allowed to settle
on his land; in 1864 when Sir Ashley Eden attempted to
stage a diplomatic journey from Darjeeling into Bhutan,
his porters deserted at the Tista River, unwilling to cross
into Bhutan. As no other laborers would carry for the
expedition, Chebu Lama within three days returned with
his own tenants to provide the service. Apparently the
porters had good reason to desert—the snows proved
much higher than anticipated, many suffered of frostbite,
some attempted to go back and were flogged as a result,
and ultimately four died from exposure to the cold (Rennie
1866).
22. For a more detailed discussion of this incident, see
Chapter Three of my dissertation (in progress), ‘States of
Labor: Markets, Migrants and Sovereignty in the IndiaNepal Borderland, 1800 to 1930.’ The former Queen
of Sikkim (from the mid-1960s until the 1970s when
her husband was deposed), Hope (Cooke) Namgyal,
has provided insight into the Sikkim court’s position on
Darjeeling’s annexation. Namgyal argues that the Sikkim
Raja was considered the owner of all the land and that
others could only be granted rights to usufruct. Thus, the
Raja of Sikkim still considered himself sovereign over the
land grant of Darjeeling and considered the residents
his subjects (Namgyal 2004). While this view of the king
as owner of the land is a by-product of 19th-century
colonialism, still it indicates the deeply entrenched view
in Sikkim that claims to Darjeeling were not entirely
superseded by the grant of 1835, by which the Company
had procured the hill station from Sikkim.
23. Respecting the interruption of friendly relations with
the Rajah of Sikkim, 369-560, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
24. Until the military campaign of 1850 Sikkim claimed him
as a subject and even thereafter, some of his clients were
taken into Nepal’s Morang by a soldier of the latter state.
36-40, Political C. Consultation, FD, 6 August 1852, NAI;
Pinn 1986.
25. No. 459, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
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26. No. 458, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.
27. No. 459, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.

Hunter, William Wilson. 1973 [1876]. A Statistical Account
of Bengal: Districts of Darjiling and Jalpaiguri, and State of Kuch
Behar. New Delhi: DK Publishing House.

28. Nos 464-468, FD, 14 June 1850, NAI.

Jackson, W. B. 2009 [1854]. Report on Darjeeling (1854).
Montana: Kessinger Legacy Reprints.
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